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From the quantitative point of view, we show that in the first year of the Japan–Australia Economic 
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1. Introduction 
Many researchers have devoted their efforts towards the sophistication of gravity 
equations. The theoretical foundation has been established by Anderson (1979), 
Bergstrand (1985, 1989), Helpman and Krugman (1985), Deardorff (1998), Eaton and 
Kortum (2002), and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). More recently, some studies, 
such as Chaney (2008) and Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), have developed 
gravity equations by allowing firm heterogeneity à la Melitz (2003). Most recently, 
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Anderson et al. (2016) and Heid and Larch (2016) have respectively introduced scale 
effects in bilateral trade costs and labor market frictions into gravity equations and have 
proposed new “gravity with X” frameworks. 
In this study, we contribute to this important literature in international trade by 
shedding light on regional trade agreement (RTA) rates. A tariff rate has been included 
into the gravity equations as only one of the components of trade costs. However, there 
are several types of tariff rates, so how alternative types of tariff rates should be treated 
in the gravity equations remains an open question. Specifically, there are not only 
general tariff rates such as most favored nation (MFN) rates, but also preferential rates 
such as RTA rates or unilateral preferential rates (e.g., generalized system of preferences 
[GSP]). Most of the studies introduce either MFN rates or applied tariff rates into the 
equation (e.g., Disdier et al., 2015). The former assumes that all exporters use MFN 
rates, even when exporting to their RTA partners, while the latter implies that all 
exporters use RTA rates when such rates are available. Obviously, both assumptions are 
not consistent with reality. For instance, Keck and Lendle (2012) show that the share of 
imports under RTA schemes in terms of total imports is below 100%, even for products 
with RTA rates that are lower than MFN rates.1 Since the use of RTA schemes requires 
exporters to incur some costs, particularly costs to certify rules of origin, all exporters 
do not necessarily utilize RTA schemes, even when exporting to their RTA partners. 
Therefore, we need to specify the gravity equations carefully when RTA rates are 
available. 
To do this, we derive a (product-level) gravity (-like) equation from a simple 
partial equilibrium model with multiple tariff schemes. The equation also incorporates 
firm heterogeneity in terms of the exporters’ productivity. Following Demidova and 
Krishna (2008) and Cherkashin et al. (2015), we theoretically demonstrate that 
exporters with higher productivity tend to gain larger profits by utilizing an RTA tariff 
scheme, rather than an MFN tariff scheme. Naturally, a change in RTA tariff rates 
affects the so-called extensive and intensive margins. For instance, some exporters who 
utilize an MFN tariff scheme will switch to an RTA tariff scheme when RTA tariff rates 
decline (extensive margin), and they will generally export more under the RTA scheme 
than under the MFN scheme. Furthermore, existing RTA users will increase their trade 
when RTA rates decline (intensive margin). These effects through the intensive and 
extensive margins imply that the relatively low RTA rates will lead to greater trade of a 
                                                   
1 Specifically, such a share of imports in Australia from the U.S. or Canada is approximately 50%. 
The share of European Union imports from Mexico is approximately 80%. A similar share can be 
found in the case of U.S. imports from Australia. 
3 
 
given product between two countries. 
Using this theoretical model, we directly derive our gravity equation; that is, the 
equation on bilateral exports. Suppose that a given product is only traded under RTA 
schemes; namely, all exporters use RTA rates. Following the literature, this situation is 
called the “homogenous regime.” In this case, the gravity equation only includes the 
RTA rates. Therefore, as in previous studies, the specification of introducing the applied 
tariff rates is theoretically supported. However, in the case of the “heterogeneous 
regime,” where a product is traded under both MFN and RTA schemes, not only RTA 
rates but also MFN rates naturally appear in the gravity formulation. Namely, the 
theory-based gravity equation for a world with RTA schemes should include both MFN 
and RTA rates. The inclusion of MFN rates implies the possibility of yielding 
omitted-variable biases in the previous studies using applied tariff rates. We unify these 
gravity equations under two regimes by introducing the “tariff ratio,” which is defined 
as the ratio of (one plus) RTA rates to (one plus) MFN rates. As a result, our gravity 
equation includes the (log) tariff ratio in addition to various kinds of fixed effects, which 
are generally used in gravity equations. 
Furthermore, we apply the tariff line–level data on trade to this gravity equation. A 
challenging issue is that eligibility in RTAs is defined at each country’s most detailed 
tariff line–level. Neither the Direction of Trade by the International Monetary Fund, nor 
the UN Comtrade by the United Nations provides such detailed trade data. Therefore, 
this study derives trade data from the World Trade Atlas (WTA) by the Global Trade 
Information Services (GTIS), in which trade data for a large number of countries are 
available at each country’s detailed tariff line–level.2 Specifically, we employ tariff 
line–level import data for 43 countries in our gravity estimations. The number of export 
countries is 181. The sample years are restricted from 2007 to 2011 in order to keep the 
version of a harmonized system (HS) consistent (i.e., HS2007). As a result, we find a 
significantly negative coefficient for the log of the tariff ratio, which is consistent with 
the above theoretical prediction. 
Our estimates show one form of the trade-creation effects of RTAs. There are a 
large number of ex-post gravity studies on trade creation. Recent examples include 
Baier and Bergstrand (2007), Magee (2008), Caporale et al. (2009), Vicard (2009), 
Medvedev (2010), and Roy (2010). These studies introduce an RTA dummy variable, 
which takes the value one for RTA members, and interpret its coefficient as the 
                                                   
2 Such data are also employed in Hayakawa et al. (2016), which regress RTA/MFN rates on trade 
values at a tariff line-level. However, the equation that they estimate is different from ours and it is 
not theoretically grounded. 
4 
 
trade-creation effects of RTAs. Cipollina and Salvatici (2010) conducted a meta-analysis 
of 85 studies, and concluded that trade-creation effects significantly exist. The approach 
using the RTA dummy identifies the total effects of RTAs, including both tariff 
reductions and the elimination of non-tariff barriers (NTBs). On the other hand, our 
estimates only capture the effects of tariff reductions through RTAs. Furthermore, by 
tracing the gradual reduction of RTA rates, we show the over-time effects of RTAs (i.e., 
the effects from their entry year to the last year of completing the scheduled tariff 
reductions). Such effects will be part of the lagged effects of RTAs shown in previous 
studies. 
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our theoretical 
framework. We specify our estimation equation in Section 3. After explaining our data 
sources in Section 4, we report our estimation results in Section 5. Then, using these 
estimates in Section 6, we conduct a simple simulation analysis of the effects of the 
subsequent reduction in RTA rates on trade. Lastly, Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
In this section, we present a partial equilibrium model that incorporates alternative 
tariff schemes: MFN and RTA schemes. The structure of the model is the usual 
monopolistic competition framework. Regarding the exporters’ choice of tariff schemes, 
we follow Demidova and Krishna (2008) and Cherkashin et al. (2015). The only 
difference from their models is that we explicitly consider that the existence of multiple 
products in each industry is consistent with our data structure. Nevertheless, it is still 
helpful to provide the theoretical model in order to demonstrate how it is connected to 
the data. 
 
2.1. Representative Household 
There are 𝐽 countries in the economy. The representative household consumes 
final products from 𝐿 industries. The utility function of the representative household in 
country 𝑗 is given by 
𝑢𝑗 = 𝑐𝑗 = � [𝑐𝑗(𝑙)]𝛽(𝑙)𝐿
𝑙=1
,         � 𝛽(𝑙)𝐿
𝑙=1
= 1. 
𝑐𝑗(𝑙) is the consumption index of products from industry 𝑙, and 𝐿 is the number of 
industries. Each product is indexed by 𝑟 and the number of products in industry 𝑙 is 
represented by 𝑅𝑙. 𝑐𝑗(𝑙) is defined as 
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𝑐𝑗(𝑙) = �� �𝑐𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)�𝜅−1𝜅𝑅𝑙
𝑟=1
�
𝜅
𝜅−1 ,         1 < 𝜅 < ∞, 
where 
𝑐𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) = �� � �𝑐𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟,𝑘)�𝜐−1𝜐 𝑑𝑘
𝑘∈Ω𝑖𝑖(𝑙,𝑟)
𝐽
𝑖=1
�
𝜐
𝜐−1 ,         1 < 𝜐 < ∞. 
𝜅 and 𝜐 represent the demand elasticity of products and varieties, respectively. Each 
variety 𝑘 is assumed to be produced by one final-good producer. Ω𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) is the set of 
varieties of product 𝑟 in industry 𝑙 purchased from country 𝑖 by the representative 
household in country 𝑗. Cost minimization implies demand schedules 
𝑐𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟,𝑘) = �𝑝𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟,𝑘)𝑝𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) �−𝜐 𝑐𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟), 
𝑐𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) = �𝑝𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)𝑝𝑗(𝑙) �−𝜅 𝑐𝑗(𝑙), and 𝑐𝑗(𝑙) = 𝛽(𝑙)�𝑝𝑗(𝑙)𝑃𝑗 �−1 𝑐𝑗 . 
Price indices are defined in the following manner: 
𝑝𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) = �� � �𝑝𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟,𝑘)�1−𝜐𝑑𝑘
𝑘∈Ω𝑖𝑖(𝑙,𝑟)
𝐽
𝑖=1
�
1
1−𝜐 , 
𝑝𝑗(𝑙) = �� �𝑝𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)�1−𝜅𝑅𝑙
𝑟=1
�
1
1−𝜅 , and 𝑃𝑗 = � �𝑝𝑗(𝑙)𝛽(𝑙) �𝛽𝑙𝐿𝑙=1 . 
 
2.2. Final-good Producers 
Final-good producers input the domestic labor force, produce outputs, and sell the 
outputs to domestic and foreign households. We assume that the production technology 
of each final-good producer 𝑘, that produces product 𝑟 of industry 𝑙 in country 𝑖, 
follows the simple linear function about the labor force given by 
𝑦𝑖(𝑙, 𝑟,𝑘) = 𝜑(𝑘)𝑛𝑖(𝑙, 𝑟,𝑘), 
where 𝜑(𝑘) represents the firm-specific components of productivity and 𝑛𝑖(𝑙, 𝑟,𝑘) is 
the labor input. We assume that 𝜑(𝑘) follows the Pareto distribution, given by 
𝐺(𝜑) = 1 − 𝜑−𝛼         𝜐 < 𝛼, 
and ranges in [1,∞). As a result of profit maximization, the mill price is derived as 
𝑝�𝑖(𝑘) = 𝜐𝜐 − 1 𝑤𝑖𝜑(𝑘), 
where 𝑤𝑖 is the wage rate. 
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2.3. Choice of Tariff Schemes 
We assume that final-good producers make the decisions on exports and tariff 
schemes. For simplicity, we do not assume any fixed costs of domestic supply without 
loss of generality. When exporting, firms can choose a tariff scheme, either an MFN 
scheme (M) or an RTA scheme (R). In any case, they need to pay fixed costs for exports, 
denoted by 𝑓𝑖.
3 Furthermore, when exporting under RTA schemes, they also need to 
incur additional fixed costs, such as documentation preparation costs, which are denoted 
by 𝑓𝑖𝑅. These two types of fixed costs are assumed to be export-country specific.
4 
The respective export prices under MFN and RTA schemes are given by 
𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑀(𝑙, 𝑟,𝑘) = 𝑇𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)𝜏𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)𝑝�𝑖(𝑘), 
𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑅(𝑙, 𝑟,𝑘) = 𝜇𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)𝑇𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)𝜏𝑖𝑗(𝑙)𝑝�𝑖(𝑘). 
𝜏𝑖𝑗 is the ice-berg physical transport costs (𝜏𝑖𝑗 > 1) for exports from country 𝑖 to 
country 𝑗. 𝑇𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) is the per-unit MFN tariff (𝑇𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) > 1) and 𝜇𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) is called the 
“tariff ratio,” which is defined as the ratio of (one plus) RTA rates to (one plus) MFN 
rates (1 > 𝜇𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) > 0).5 
Under these settings, sales profits can be derived as follows: 
𝜋𝑖𝑗
𝑀(𝑙, 𝑟,𝑘) = Φ(𝑘)�𝑇𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)�−𝜐𝜁𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) − 𝑓𝑖 , 
                                                   
3 Following Helpman et al. (2004) and Helpman et al. (2008), we assume that exporters pay fixed 
costs for exports to each destination without considering the case where exporters deal with export 
processes for multiple destinations at the same time and save on the total fixed cost. In other words, 
the economies of scale are not considered for 𝑓𝑖. Also in terms of the fixed cost for RTA utilization, 
we assume a similar situation; i.e., exporters pay the fixed cost for RTA utilization for each 
transaction. Given that the model is static, mitigation of these fixed costs through the exporters’ 
experiences is not considered. Investigating these possibilities would provide richer theoretical 
consequences, but we do not examine such cases in order to keep the model tractable and to obtain 
explicit gravity equations. 
4 Our gravity equation does not change, even if we assume that the production technology has a 
product-specific component of productivity, which is denoted by 𝑎𝑙 ; i.e., 
𝑦𝑖(𝑙, 𝑟,𝑘) = 𝑎(𝑙)𝜑(𝑘)𝑛𝑖(𝑙, 𝑟,𝑘). An alternative specification is to assume that the distribution of 
productivity is heterogeneous across products. Similarly, it is possible to assume that other 
parameters, including 𝜐, 𝑓𝑖, and 𝑓𝑖𝑅, are product specific. These heterogeneity assumptions do not 
make any qualitative changes on our major results, although the estimated coefficients in the gravity 
equation become different across products. 
5 Although we assume that the use of RTA schemes does not require exporters to incur additional 
variable costs, it would be more natural to assume product-specific additional variable costs, which 
are based on the adjustment of inputs in order to comply with the rules of origin. However, our 
gravity equation does not change, unless such variable costs are country pair-product-specific. It 
should also be noted that multilateral and bilateral RTAs differ in terms of variable costs, as 
multilateral RTAs are supposed to impose lower additional variable costs than bilateral RTAs, as a 
result of the cumulation rules for multilateral RTAs. In our model, multilateral and bilateral RTAs are 
not differentiated, as we ignore the existence of these variable costs. 
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𝜋𝑖𝑗
𝑅 (𝑙, 𝑟,𝑘) = Φ(𝑘)�𝜇𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)𝑇𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)�−𝜐𝜁𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) − 𝑓𝑖 − 𝑓𝑖𝑅 , 
where 
Φ(𝑘) = [𝜑(𝑘)]𝜐−1, 
𝜁𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) = �𝜈 − 1𝑤𝑖 �𝜈−1 � 1𝜏𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)𝜈�𝜈 �𝑝𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)�𝜐−𝜅 �𝑝𝑗(𝑙)�𝜅−1 𝛽(𝑙)𝑃𝑗𝑐𝑗 . 
Thus, sales profits are found to be increasing in 𝜑(𝑘). Further, we obtain the following 
relation: 
𝜋𝑖𝑗
𝑅 (𝑙, 𝑟, 𝑘) − 𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑀(𝑙, 𝑟,𝑘) = Φ(𝑘)[𝑇𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)]−𝜐𝜁𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) �� 1𝜇𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)�𝜈 − 1� − 𝑓𝑖𝑅 . 
This implies that RTA is more beneficial than MFN for the more productive producers 
because the tariff rate is lower for RTA than for MFN. 
Exporters optimally choose the tariff scheme that realizes the largest export profits. 
Thus, the optimization of exporters on the choice of tariff schemes is given by max�0,𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑀(𝑙, 𝑟,𝑘),𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑅 (𝑙, 𝑟,𝑘)�. 
We have three productivity thresholds. The first and second ones define the ranges of 
producers that gain positive profits by exporting under MFN and RTA, respectively. 
They are derived in the following manner: 
Φ�𝑖𝑗
𝑀(𝑙, 𝑟) = 𝑓𝑖
𝜁𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) [𝑇𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)]𝜐        and         Φ�𝑖𝑗𝑅 (𝑙, 𝑟) = 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑓𝑖𝑅𝜁𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) [𝜇𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)𝑇𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)]𝜐. 
On the choice of tariff scheme, we have the third threshold, as follows: 
Φ�𝑖𝑗
𝑅>𝑀(𝑙, 𝑟) = 𝑓𝑖𝑅
𝜁𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) �[𝜇𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)𝑇𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)]−𝜐 − [𝑇𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)]−𝜐�−1. 
Thus, producers prefer RTA to MFN if Φ�𝑖𝑗𝑅>𝑀(𝑙, 𝑟) < Φ(𝑘). A product is exported 
under multiple tariff schemes when Φ�𝑖𝑗𝑅 (𝑙, 𝑟) > Φ�𝑖𝑗𝑀(𝑙, 𝑟), which corresponds to the 
heterogeneous regime discussed in Demidova and Krishna (2008). We can rewrite this 
condition by 
�1 + 𝑓𝑖𝑅
𝑓𝑖
�
1
𝜐 > 1
𝜇𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟). 
When this condition does not hold, product 𝑟 in industry 𝑙 is only exported under the 
RTA scheme. We call this the homogeneous regime.6 
                                                   
6 Assuming an upper bound of productivity enables us to replicate products that are only traded 
under the MFN tariff scheme. We examine this case in Appendix A. Even if we assume an upper 
bound, our qualitative results are unchanged. 
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Figures 1 and 2 depict the exporters’ choice of tariff scheme in terms of 
homogeneous and heterogeneous regimes, respectively. In the homogeneous regime, all 
of the exporters utilize the RTA tariff scheme. This case is more likely to happen when 
the fixed costs for RTA utilization are small relative to those for exports or when the 
tariff ratio is significantly low. In these cases, the relative attractiveness of RTA to MFN 
is high for exporters. As a result, all of the exporters become RTA users. In contrast, 
when the fixed costs for RTA utilization are high, relative to those for exports or when 
the tariff ratio is significantly high, some exporters will utilize the MFN tariff scheme. 
 
===   Figures 1 & 2   === 
 
 
3. Empirical Specification 
Based on the above theoretical framework, this section provides an estimable 
gravity equation. Specifically, we derive product-level bilateral exports. Since the 
theoretical formulation is different between the homogenous and heterogeneous regimes, 
we derive the exports for the two regimes separately and then unify them into one 
estimation equation. 
 
3.1. Homogeneous Regime 
For the various products that are only exported under the RTA scheme (i.e., those 
in the homogeneous regime), total exports (𝑄𝑖𝑗𝐴(𝑙, 𝑟)) are obtained in the following 
manner: 
𝑄𝑖𝑗
𝐴(𝑙, 𝑟) = 𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑅(𝑙, 𝑟) = � 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑅(𝑙, 𝑟,𝑘)𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑅(𝑙, 𝑟,𝑘)𝐺(𝜑),∞
�Φ� 𝑖𝑖
𝑅 (𝑙,𝑟)� 1𝜐−1  
or 
𝑄𝑖𝑗
𝐴(𝑙, 𝑟)= 𝜉𝑏𝑖𝐴𝑤𝑖−𝛼�𝑃𝑗𝑐𝑗� 𝛼𝜐−1[𝛽(𝑙)] 𝛼𝜐−1�𝜏𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)�−𝜄�𝑝𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)�𝛾�𝑝𝑗(𝑙)�𝛾�𝑇𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)�−𝜄�𝜇𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)�−𝜄, (1) 
where 
𝜉 ≡
𝛼
𝛼 − 𝜐 + 1 �1𝜐�𝛼−𝜐+1𝜐−1 �𝜐 − 1𝜐 �𝛼 > 0,               𝑏𝑖𝐴 ≡ � 1𝑓𝑖 + 𝑓𝑖𝑅�𝛼−𝜐+1𝜐−1 > 0, 
𝜄 ≡
𝜐(𝛼 − 𝜐 + 1)
𝜐 − 1 + 𝜐 − 1 > 0,         𝛾 ≡ 𝛼(𝜐 − 𝜅)𝜐 − 1 . 
Some existing studies, such as Disdier et al. (2015), introduce RTA tariff rates 
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(i.e., applied tariff rates) into a gravity equation. Such an equation appears when we 
rewrite equation (1) in the following manner: 
𝑄𝑖𝑗
𝐴(𝑙, 𝑟) = 𝜉𝑏𝑖𝐴𝑤𝑖−𝛼�𝑃𝑗𝑐𝑗� 𝛼𝜐−1[𝛽(𝑙)] 𝛼𝜐−1�𝜏𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)�−𝜄�𝑝𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)�𝛾�𝑝𝑗(𝑙)�𝛾�𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑅(𝑙, 𝑟)�−𝜄. 
Note that the RTA tariff rate 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑅(𝑙, 𝑟) is defined as 𝑇𝑗𝑅(𝑙, 𝑟) ≡ 𝜇𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)𝑇𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟). This 
equation only includes the RTA rates, not the MFN rates, as all exporters utilize the RTA 
scheme in this homogeneous regime. It shows that exports become larger when RTA 
tariff rates become lower, as found in the existing studies. In short, the gravity equation 
used in the existing studies is nested within our framework as an extreme case, where 
the products are only traded under the RTA scheme. 
Log linearization of (1) leads to ln𝑄𝑖𝑗𝐴(𝑙, 𝑟) = 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑢𝑗 + 𝑢𝑗(𝑙) + 𝑢𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) + 𝑢(𝑙) − 𝜄 ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) − 𝜄 ln𝜇𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟),       (2) 
where 
𝑢𝑖 ≡ ln[𝜉𝑏𝑖𝐴𝑤𝑖−𝛼] , 𝑢𝑗 ≡ 𝛼𝜐 − 1 ln𝑃𝑗 + 𝛼𝜐 − 1 ln 𝑐𝑗 , 𝑢𝑗(𝑙) ≡ 𝛾 ln 𝑝𝑗(𝑙) ,
𝑢𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) ≡ 𝛾 ln𝑝𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) − 𝜄 ln𝑇𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) ,   𝑢(𝑙) ≡ 𝛼𝜐 − 1 ln𝛽(𝑙). 
Equation (2) provides a direct way to examine the effect of the tariff ratio on the exports 
of a given product that is only traded under the RTA tariff scheme. 
Equation (2) implies that the tariff ratio negatively affects total exports. Figure 3 
demonstrates how a fall in the tariff ratio affects exports, considering both intensive and 
extensive margins in the homogeneous regime. Potential RTA profits increase for all 
firms when the tariff ratio falls and the RTA rates are reduced (i.e., the RTA profit line 
rotates counterclockwise). The “new” RTA profit locus is represented by the line 
𝜋𝑖𝑗
𝑅′(𝑙, 𝑟,𝑘). In this case, the existing RTA users increase their exports. This increase 
represents the effect through the intensive margin. As a result of the rotation of the RTA 
profit locus, the threshold productivity Φ�𝑖𝑗𝑅 (𝑙, 𝑟) falls to Φ�𝑖𝑗𝑅′(𝑙, 𝑟), and some firms 
become new exporters, particularly RTA exporters. Such “new exporters” obviously 
contribute toward increasing total exports. This increase represents the effect through 
the extensive margin. In sum, both margins imply negative effects of the tariff ratio on 
exports. Thus, we predict a negative sign for the coefficient of the tariff ratio for 
products that belong to the homogeneous regime. 
 
===   Figure 3   === 
 
3.2. Heterogeneous Regime 
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In the case of the heterogeneous regime, where a product is exported under both 
MFN and RTA schemes, total exports (𝑄𝑖𝑗𝐵(𝑙)) are obtained in the following manner: 
𝑄𝑖𝑗
𝐵(𝑙, 𝑟) = 𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑀(𝑙, 𝑟) + 𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑅(𝑙, 𝑟)
= � 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑀(𝑙, 𝑟,𝑘)𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑀(𝑙, 𝑟,𝑘)𝐺(𝜑)�Φ� 𝑖𝑖𝑅>𝑀(𝑙,𝑟)� 1𝜐−1
�Φ� 𝑖𝑖
𝑀(𝑙,𝑟)� 1𝜐−1+ � 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑅 (𝑙, 𝑟,𝑘)𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑅(𝑙, 𝑟, 𝑘)𝐺(𝜑),∞
�Φ� 𝑖𝑖
𝑅>𝑀(𝑙,𝑟)� 1𝜐−1  
or 
𝑄𝑖𝑗
𝐵(𝑙, 𝑟)= 𝜉𝑏𝑖𝐵𝑤𝑖−𝛼�𝑃𝑗𝑐𝑗� 𝛼𝜐−1[𝛽(𝑙)] 𝛼𝜐−1�𝜏𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)�−𝜄�𝑝𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)�𝛾�𝑝𝑗(𝑙)�𝛾�𝑇𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)�−𝜄𝐹𝑖 �𝜇𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)�, 
where 
𝑏𝑖
𝐵 ≡ �
1
𝑓𝑖
�
𝛼−𝜐+1
𝜐−1 , 
𝐹𝑖 �𝜇𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)� ≡ 1 + � 𝑓𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑅 ��𝜇𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)�−𝜐 − 1��𝛼−𝜐+1𝜐−1 ��𝜇𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)�1−𝜐 − 1�. 
Importantly, and unlike the case of the homogenous regime, the gravity equation 
includes both MFN and RTA rates. The introduction of applied tariff rates cannot 
simultaneously control for these two types of tariff rates. Therefore, the gravity 
estimates in previous studies may suffer from omitted-variable biases based on our 
examination of the products that are traded under both MFN and RTA schemes. 
The log linearization of the above equation leads to ln𝑄𝑖𝑗𝐵(𝑙, 𝑟) = 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑣𝑗 + 𝑣𝑗(𝑙) + 𝑣𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) + 𝑣(𝑙) − 𝜄 ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) − 𝜔𝑖 ln𝜇𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟),           (3) 
where 
𝑣𝑖 ≡ ln𝐹𝑖(𝜇) + 𝜔𝑖 ln𝜇 + ln[𝜉𝑤𝑖−𝛼𝑏𝑖𝐵] , 𝑣𝑗 ≡ 𝛼𝜐 − 1 ln𝑃𝑗 + 𝛼𝜐 − 1 ln 𝑐𝑗 ,   
𝑣𝑗(𝑙) ≡ 𝛾 ln 𝑝𝑗(𝑙),   𝑣𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) ≡ 𝛾 ln 𝑝𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) − 𝜄 ln𝑇𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) ,   𝑣(𝑙) ≡ 𝛼𝜐 − 1 ln𝛽(𝑙). 
In this derivation, and to break down the highly nonlinear equation to a linear and 
estimable gravity framework, we use the following Taylor approximation:7 
                                                   
7 See Anderson et al. (2016), Baier and Bergstrand (2009), and Behar and Nelson (2014) for the use 
of the Taylor approximation for the study of gravity equations. 
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ln𝐹𝑖 �𝜇𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)� ≅ ln𝐹𝑖(𝜇) − 𝜔𝑖�ln 𝜇𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) − ln 𝜇�, 
where 
𝜔𝑖 ≡ −
𝑑 ln𝐹𝑖 �𝜇𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)�
𝑑 ln𝜇𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) �
𝜇𝑖𝑖(𝑙,𝑟)=𝜇 > 0, 
and 𝜇 is the averaged value of 𝜇𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟). Equation (3) provides a direct way to examine 
the effect of the tariff ratio on the export of a given product that is traded under both 
MFN and RTA tariff schemes. 
Equation (3) implies that the tariff ratio negatively affects total exports. Figure 4 
demonstrates how a fall in the tariff ratio affects total exports through the intensive and 
extensive margins in the heterogeneous regime. In terms of the intensive margin, the 
intuition is exactly the same as the case of the homogeneous regime; existing RTA users 
increase their exports when the tariff ratio falls. The RTA profit locus rotates 
counterclockwise (to the line 𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑅′(𝑙, 𝑟,𝑘)) with a fall in the tariff ratio and the threshold 
productivity Φ�𝑖𝑗𝑅≥𝑀(𝑙, 𝑟) falls to Φ�𝑖𝑗𝑅≥𝑀′(𝑙, 𝑟). As a result, on the extensive margin, 
some of the MFN exporters switch to become RTA exporters when the tariff ratio falls 
in the case of the heterogeneous regime. These “switching” RTA users increase their 
exports because their tariff rates, which are now the RTA rates, are lower than before 
(i.e., MFN rates). Thus, total exports also increase through the extensive margin in the 
heterogeneous regime. Again, both margins imply negative effects of the tariff ratio on 
exports. Thus, the tariff ratio is expected to negatively affect exports for products that 
belong to the heterogeneous regime. 
 
===   Figure 4   === 
 
3.3. Estimation Equation 
In this subsection, we unify the two gravity equations above. As explained in the 
next section, our dataset does not allow us to estimate separate gravity equations for the 
homogenous and heterogeneous regimes. Such separate estimations are possible if we 
employ the trade data according to the tariff schemes that are used in, for example, 
Keck and Lendle (2012). In this case, however, we need to focus on trade by some 
specific countries because such data by tariff scheme are only available in a few 
countries, such as the United States. Since the purpose of this study is the extension of 
gravity equations that are usually estimated for worldwide trade, we estimate the unified 
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gravity equation for worldwide trade rather than the gravity equations for trade in a 
specific country according to the regimes. 
The gravity equation we estimate is as follows. Since our dataset includes trade 
over a period of years, we extend equations (2) and (3) to include a time dimension. 
Furthermore, we assume that the physical transport costs (i.e., 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑖) are specified as  
𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑖(𝑙, 𝑟) = 𝑑𝑖𝑗ς(𝑙,𝑟)𝜖?̃?𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟, 𝑡). 
𝑑𝑖𝑗  is the geographical distance between countries i and j and is a time-invariant 
element. ς(𝑙, 𝑟)  and 𝜖?̃?𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟, 𝑡)  are a distance parameter and a disturbance term, 
respectively. As a result, appreciating the nature of our time-variant, country-pair 
product dataset, we can simplify our estimation equation as follows: ln𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑖 = 𝛽 ln 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑗𝑟𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑟 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑖,                                     (4) 
where 𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑖 is the total exports of product r from countries i to j in year t. 𝑒𝑖𝑖, 𝑒𝑗𝑟𝑖, 
and 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑟  are exporter-year fixed effects, importer-product-year fixed effects, and 
exporter-importer-product fixed effects, respectively. Also, 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑖 = ln 𝜖?̃?𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟, 𝑡). 
Namely, except for tariff ratio (i.e., 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑖)—which is the only time-variant, country-pair, 
and product-specific variable—all other elements can be captured by the fixed effects. 
One noteworthy point is that, as demonstrated above, 𝛽 should differ by regime, 
(i.e., homogeneous and heterogeneous regimes). 𝛽 should be −𝜄 in the case of the 
homogenous regime and −𝜔𝑖 in the case of the heterogeneous regime. However, since 
our dataset does not enable us to differentiate trade regimes (i.e., tariff schemes), we 
cannot divide the sample into products traded under homogeneous and heterogeneous 
regimes; thus, we cannot estimate equation (4) for those regimes separately. What we 
can do is to estimate it for the whole sample, including both transactions under the 
homogeneous and heterogeneous regimes. One of our unique outcomes is that we prove 
that our estimate of 𝛽 becomes a weighted average of coefficients under the two 
regimes (see Appendix B). In our case, the estimated coefficient becomes 
𝜊𝐴(−𝜄) + 𝜊𝐵(−𝜔𝑖). 
𝜊𝐴 and 𝜊𝐵 are the weights for the coefficients of the respective regimes and they range 
between 0 and 1. The predicted sign is negative. 
From a theoretical point of view, the coefficient under the heterogeneous regime 
differs by exporting country. For example, its absolute value becomes lower when 
𝑓𝑖
𝑅 𝑓𝑖⁄  is higher because a higher 𝑓𝑖𝑅 𝑓𝑖⁄  leads to a lower share of RTA users for all 
exporters and thus, there is a smaller effect of the tariff ratio on total exports. In the 
baseline estimation, we do not differentiate this coefficient across exporting countries 
and thus, we estimate the world average. In the robustness check, we take this 
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difference among exporters into account to some extent. 
 
 
4. Empirical Issues 
In this section, we explain our data sources and discuss some empirical issues. 
Since μ is generally defined at each import country’s tariff line–level, we define product 
at an import country’s tariff line–level and draw our tariff line–level import data from 
the database of WTA by GTIS. As in the regular trade databases such as UN Comtrade, 
this database does not enable us to identify the various tariff schemes in the transactions. 
However, it provides tariff line–level data on trade. GTIS was established in 1993. 
According to its website, the data are only obtained from the official sources for each 
reporting country (e.g., customs or national statistics agencies). This database has been 
used by corporations, governments, and associations in more than 50 countries. 
Although the WTA database is not often used in academic studies compared to, at least, 
the UN Comtrade database, it is reliable enough for academic trade analyses. 
Our importing countries are selected based on data accessibility.8 Furthermore, as 
explained below, we integrate the tariff data with the import data. Therefore, we also do 
not include import data for countries in which the tariff data are not available. In order 
to keep the version of the HS system consistent over the sample years used to construct 
a panel dataset, we restrict the sample years to the 2007–2011 period (i.e., HS2007). 
Therefore, we do not include importing countries in which the tariff/trade data are only 
available in versions other than HS2007. Furthermore, if a country switches the HS 
version during the above period, we only keep the importing country–year pairs under 
the HS2007 version. The number of sample years thus differs across importing countries. 
As a result, the number of importing and exporting countries becomes 43 and 181, 
respectively (see Appendix C). 
We match the tariff data with the above import data at the tariff line–levels. The 
detailed tariff data are obtained from the database of the World Integrated Trade 
Solution (WITS). In the database, various kinds of tariff schemes, including not only 
MFN schemes and RTA schemes, but also GSP, are available. Since our main interest in 
this study lies in the effects of RTAs, we only use RTA rates in addition to MFN rates. 
We use ad valorem equivalent rates for non-ad valorem tariff rates. When multiple RTA 
rates are available, we choose the lowest rates for each product.9 To combine the data on 
                                                   
8 The Institute of Developing Economies has authority to access this database. 
9 For example, Japan has bilateral and multilateral RTAs with Thailand (i.e., Japan-Thailand 
Economic Partnership Agreement and ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership). 
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trade and tariffs, we aggregate the number of digits in the tariff data when the number of 
digits in the most detailed level is finer in the tariff data than the trade data and pick the 
lowest tariff rates within the category of this aggregation. Using this tariff dataset, we 
compute the ratio of one plus RTA rates to one plus MFN rates (i.e., the tariff ratio). For 
example, when the RTA and MFN rates are 5% and 10%, respectively, the tariff ratio is 
calculated as (1+0.05)/(1+0.1) = 0.95. When the RTA rates are not available, we 
introduce the MFN rates to the RTA rates. Namely, in this case, the tariff ratio is equal 
to the value one. The basic statistics are presented in Table 1. 
 
===   Table 1   === 
 
There are two noteworthy empirical issues. First, in the recent literature on gravity, 
zero-valued trade is a hot issue. Recent research addressing this issue uses the 
pseudo-poisson maximum likelihood technique (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) or the 
extended technique of the Heckman two-step estimation (Helpman et al., 2008). We do 
not rigorously take this issue into account because, under these non-linear estimation 
methods, it is difficult to include our fixed effects. In our study, nearly 50% of the 
observations have zero-valued trade. Although this amount is not trivial and it is 
reasonable because of the nature of our dataset (i.e., exporter-importer-tariff line–year 
data), we simply drop these observations. This is because we believe that not controlling 
for such fixed effects yields more serious biases than not taking into account the 
zero-trade issue in a rigorous manner. Nevertheless, we will tackle the zero-valued trade 
issue in the later estimation. Second, we exclude products with zero MFN rates in the 
baseline estimation, since the entry of RTA does not change the tariff rates for such 
products. In the later estimation, we will also estimate the model by including such 
products. 
 
 
5. Empirical Results 
In this section, we estimate equation (4). We first report our basic estimation 
results. Then, several alternative estimations are conducted to employ our gravity 
equation. 
 
5.1. Basic Estimation Results 
Our baseline results are presented in column (I) in Table 2. The coefficient for the 
(log) tariff ratio (i.e., μ) is estimated to be significantly negative, as is consistent with 
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our theoretical prediction. We also estimate the model for all observations, including 
those with zero MFN rates, and report the results in column (II). The number of 
observations greatly increases. The coefficient for the tariff ratio is again estimated to be 
significantly negative, although the absolute magnitude decreases somewhat. In addition, 
in order to further control for the variations across products, we include 
exporter-product-year fixed effects instead of exporter-year fixed effects, although our 
theoretical gravity model does not necessarily require us to include these effects.10 The 
results are shown in columns (III) and (IV), and they are qualitatively unchanged, 
although the absolute magnitude greatly increases.11 
 
===   Table 2   === 
 
5.2. Further Controls and RTA Eligibility 
In the following subsections, we estimate various models to show the robustness 
of our above results. In column (I) of Table 3, we introduce importer-exporter-year fixed 
effects in order to further control for time-variant country-pair elements such as 
exchange rates. The coefficient is estimated to be negatively significant. As in the case 
of controlling for exporter-product-year fixed effects, the absolute magnitude rises. In 
column (II), we exclude observations in which RTA rates are not available. The tariff 
ratio becomes the value one for half of our observations (with positive MFN rates). This 
sample distribution may yield some biases to the coefficient. Indeed, the estimation 
result shows a significantly negative coefficient, and a great rise in the absolute 
magnitude. 
 
===   Table 3   === 
 
5.3. Specific Products 
We estimate our model for three specific sets of observations. First, we restrict the 
observations for our estimations to those in the manufacturing industries (i.e., excluding 
products in HS chapters 01–24). As mentioned above, ad valorem equivalent rates are 
used for non-ad valorem tariff rates. However, it is well known that these rates differ by 
                                                   
10  As is well known, the internationally common digit of HS codes is six. Therefore, 
exporter-product-year fixed effects are constructed based on HS six-digit codes, while we use 
tariff-line codes for the construction of importer-product-year and importer-exporter-product fixed 
effects. 
11 Some quantitative interpretation is provided in Section 6. 
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years of computation because of the changes in trade prices and thus, they may contain 
some errors. To avoid suffering from biases, we focus on trade in the manufacturing 
industries, in which tariff rates are likely to be in an ad valorem form. Second, the 
observations are restricted to trade in differentiated products simply because our 
theoretical model is based on such trade in differentiated products. The classification of 
differentiated products is based on the “liberal” classification of products by Rauch 
(1999). Third, sample products are only restricted to finished products. In the theoretical 
framework, we focus on trade in finished products. This focus is just for simplicity, but 
the choice of tariff schemes might be different between finished and intermediate 
products. For example, some countries allow duty-free imports of intermediate products 
that are used for exported products. In this case, firms do not need to pay the import 
duties without complying with the rules of origin. Therefore, we only estimate our 
model for trade in finished products, which are included in the 112, 112, 41, 51, 52, 62, 
and 63 categories within the Broad Economic Categories. These results are shown in 
Table 4 and are qualitatively unchanged from those in Table 2, although the absolute 
magnitude rises. 
 
===   Table 4   === 
 
5.4. Heterogeneous Coefficients according to Exporters 
Next, we take into consideration the difference in tariff ratio coefficients across 
export countries using two approaches under our assumption that their magnitudes are 
related to the level of economic development in the export countries. One is to estimate 
our gravity equation for the high- and low-income exporters separately. 12  The 
estimation results are reported in the “Exporters” column in Table 5. In both cases of the 
high- and low-income exporters, the coefficients are estimated to be significantly 
negative. The absolute effect is somewhat larger when exporting from the low-income 
countries. The other is to introduce the interaction term of the tariff ratio with GDP per 
capita in the export country. The results are shown in the “Interaction” column in Table 
5 and they are qualitatively unchanged from the previous results in the “Exporters” 
                                                   
12 Following World Bank classifications of income as of 2010, we divide our sample countries into 
high- and low-income countries. The following countries are classified as high-income countries: 
ABW, ADO, ANT, ARE, AUS, AUT, BEL, BHR, BHS, BMU, BRB, BRN, CAN, CHE, CHI, CYM, 
CYP, CZE, DEU, DNK, ESP, EST, FIN, FRA, FRO, GBR, GIB, GNQ, GRC, GRL, GUM, HKG, 
HRV, HUN, IMY, IRL, ISL, ISR, ITA, JPN, KOR, KWT, LIE, LUX, LVA, MAC, MCO, MLT, MNP, 
NCL, NLD, NOR, NZL, OMN, POL, PRI, PRT, PYF, QAT, SAU, SGP, SMR, SVK, SVN, SWE, 
TCA, TTO, USA, VIR. 
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column. Namely, exporters with higher income/GDP per capita have a smaller absolute 
effect on the tariff ratio. As mentioned in the previous section, the difference in 𝑓𝑖𝑅 𝑓𝑖⁄  
across exporting countries plays a key role in the difference in coefficients. Our results 
imply that 𝑓𝑖𝑅 𝑓𝑖⁄  is higher in the high-income exporting countries.
13 
 
===   Table 5   === 
 
5.5. Controlling for the Non-Tariff Effects of RTAs 
The next analysis is the estimation of a gravity equation with the regular RTA 
dummy variable, which takes the value one for country pairs with RTAs. This 
estimation controls for not only the effect of tariff reductions, but also some other 
effects of RTAs, such as the effect of eliminating NTBs. Although the latter effects are 
already controlled for when we introduce importer-exporter-year fixed effects (i.e., (I) in 
Table 3), we try to quantify these two types of RTA effects separately by explicitly 
introducing the RTA dummy variable. In column (I) in Table 6, we only introduce the 
RTA dummy, not the tariff ratio. As in the previous study on the trade-creation effects of 
RTAs, we obtain a significantly positive coefficient. The average effect of RTAs on 
trade is a 4.3% increase. We include both the RTA dummy and tariff ratio in column (II) 
and find that the tariff ratio coefficient is still significantly negative. While a tariff 
reduction through RTAs contributes to increasing trade by 3.8% (=−0.976 * −0.0387) on 
average, the other effects of RTAs increase trade by 1.2% (= exp(0.012) −1). 
 
===   Table 6   === 
 
5.6. Tariff Ratio versus Preference Margin 
We replace the tariff ratio (i.e., the ratio of RTA rates to MFN rates) with the 
preference margin (i.e., the difference between the MFN and RTA rates). So, far, based 
                                                   
13 In general, both fixed costs for exporting and RTA utilization will be lower in the high-income 
countries. Nevertheless, the difference in fixed costs for RTA utilization may be trivial because the 
absolute magnitude of these costs per se is not very large. On the other hand, the absolute magnitude 
of the fixed costs for exporting is much larger than that of the fixed costs for RTA utilization and 
thus, the difference between high- and low-income countries will be rather large. For example, while 
Das et al. (2007) structurally estimated the fixed costs of entry to the export markets and found that 
the sunk components are about US$400,000, Cherkashin et al. (2015) structurally estimated the 
documentation costs of compliance on the rules of origin in preferential trade and showed that these 
costs were US$4,240. As a result, the much lower fixed costs for exports from the high-income 
countries relative to the low-income countries lead to a higher 𝑓𝑖𝑅 𝑓𝑖⁄  and thus, a smaller absolute 
magnitude of the coefficient for high-income exporters, which is consistent with our above result. 
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on our theoretical framework, we have used the log of the tariff ratio as a main 
independent variable. Its formulation is more tractable when theoretically examining the 
role of RTA rates relative to that of MFN rates.14 However, many empirical studies on 
RTA utilization rates (i.e., the share of trade values under RTA in total trade values) have 
used the preference margin.15 Therefore, as another robustness check, we estimate the 
model with the preference margin and report its estimation results in Table 7. We 
estimate this model for trade in products with positive MFN rates and for all products. 
Due to the change in variable formulation, the coefficient is estimated to be significantly 
positive. However, as is consistent with the previous results, it indicates that the lower 
the RTA rates relative to the MFN rates, the larger the bilateral trade values. 
 
===   Table 7   === 
 
5.7. Zero-valued Trade at the Tariff Line–Level  
In this last subsection, we examine the issue of zero-valued trade. First, we simply 
estimate the linear-probability model on whether or not to trade. Namely, the dependent 
variable is a binary variable that takes the value one for observations with positive trade 
values and the value zero for those with no trade values. The independent variables are 
the same as in equation (4). Due to our inclusion of a large number of dummy variables 
or fixed effects, we do not estimate the non-linear model (i.e., probit or logit models). 
The results are shown in column (I) in Table 8. The inclusion of zero-valued trade 
doubles the number of observations compared with the previous estimation. The results 
show a negatively significant coefficient for the tariff ratio, indicating that a trade 
relationship is likely to form in the products with low RTA rates relative to MFN rates. 
Figure 3 provides the rationale for this empirical finding. Suppose that products are 
traded using only RTA tariff rates (i.e., a homogeneous regime). The RTA profit locus 
rotates anticlockwise when the tariff ratio falls. As a result, some potential exporters 
will enter the market and begin to export using the RTA tariff rates. In a heterogeneous 
regime, the same holds true when such rotation of the RTA profit locus is great enough 
to change the regime to a homogenous regime. In sum, the number of exporters and thus 
exports are expected to increase when the tariff ratio falls. 
                                                   
14 In addition, the reason for not separately introducing both the MFN and RTA rates is that these 
two rates are highly correlated (remember that RTA rates are equal to MFN rates when RTA rates are 
not available). 
15 See, for example, Bureau et al. (2007), Francois et al. (2006), Manchin (2006), and Hakobyan 
(2015). 
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Second, we aggregate our tariff line–level observations up to the HS six-digit 
level or the total level. Accordingly, the tariff ratio is also aggregated by taking a 
weighted-average of the tariff line–level tariff ratio. Import values are used as a weight. 
We drop the observations in which the average MFN rates are zero. Such aggregation 
obviously reduces the share of zero-valued observations in the total number of possible 
observations. The results are shown in columns (I) and (II) in Table 8. Both cases show 
significantly negative coefficients for the tariff ratio, as is consistent with our tariff line–
level results. In sum, we conclude that the trade values are likely to be larger for the 
products with low RTA rates relative to MFN rates. 
 
 
6. Simple Simulation 
Using our estimates, we conduct a simple simulation on the effects of the 
subsequent reduction in RTA rates on trade in order to see the quantitative effects of our 
estimates. As is well known, tariff rates are not necessarily totally eliminated 
immediately after the RTAs take effect. The tariff reductions may start years after their 
introduction and/or the tariff rates may be proportionally reduced each year. As a result, 
due to such “staging” or “phase-in” structures of RTA tariff reductions, the ratio of RTA 
rates to MFN rates usually continues to decrease in some RTAs over time. 
As an illustration, we employ the data on Japan’s scheduled RTA rates for the 
Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement (JAEPA), which are obtained from 
the Customs Agency in Japan. The simple reason for this EPA choice is that we have all 
of the scheduled EPA rates at the tariff line–level under the common HS version (i.e., 
HS2012). While JAEPA came into effect in January 2015, its tariff 
reduction/elimination was scheduled to be completed in 2032 (i.e., after 18 years). We 
consistently use the MFN rates in 2014 for our computation of the ratio of RTA rates to 
MFN rates, take the average of that ratio by year, and then multiply our estimates with 
the log-difference in the average between each year and 2014 (i.e., the value one). We 
exclude the products with non-ad valorem MFN rates, which accounts for only 0.2% of 
all products. Also, products with non-ad valorem RTA rates are also excluded (2%). 
The transition of the effects is depicted in Figure 5. We use the estimates in the 
“Interaction” column in Table 5. Using GDP per-capita in Australia in 2014, we 
compute the marginal effect of the tariff ratio in the case of exports from Australia 
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(−1.52). Again, notice that these effects are only for the trade in products with positive 
MFN rates as of 2014, although 57% of all tariff-line products still have positive MFN 
rates in Japan. The vertical left axis shows the percentage increase in exports from 
Australia to Japan compared with exports in 2014 (i.e., just before JAEPA’s effective 
date). It indicates the cumulative effects of the tariff reductions on trade. We also show 
the estimates in Magee (2008, Model 3 in Table 1), which indicate the world-average 
cumulative effects of the total RTA effects. Unlike our estimates, Magee’s estimates are 
obtained from a country-level analysis, not a tariff line–level analysis, and include trade 
in products with zero MFN rates. 
 
===   Figure 5   === 
 
As a result, there are three noteworthy points. First, our smaller effects than those 
for Magee look reasonable because we only include the effects of tariff reductions, 
while Magee includes the total effects (i.e., the effects of not only the tariff reductions 
but also the reduction/elimination of NTBs). Second, in the first year of JAEPA (i.e., 
2015), exports from Australia to Japan were expected to increase by 6% compared with 
exports in 2014. Third, our effects show a smoother trend than those for Magee. This 
trend is natural because we based our calculations on the scheduled tariff reductions, in 
which the typical pattern is proportional over an annual period. Indeed, based on the 
corresponding patterns of tariff reduction in JAEPA, our cumulative effects relatively 
grow from 2015 to 2018, but do not change very much after 2024. 
 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
This study contributes to the literature on gravity analysis by explicitly 
incorporating both MFN and RTA rates. Our gravity equation takes into consideration 
the fact that all exporters do not necessarily utilize RTA schemes when exporting 
products, even to their RTA partners, due to the existence of compliance costs under the 
rules of origin. We apply the tariff line–level data for worldwide trade to our gravity 
equation. As a result, we find a significantly negative coefficient for the ratio of RTA 
rates to MFN rates. This result is qualitatively unchanged, even when we restrict our 
sample to various sets. Also, the absolute magnitude is larger when exporting from 
lower-income countries. From the quantitative point of view we show that, in the first 
year of JAEPA (i.e., 2015), exports from Australia to Japan are expected to increase by 
6% compared to exports in 2014. Furthermore, it is shown that, based on the subsequent 
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reduction in RTA rates, the magnitude of the trade-creation effect through tariff 
reductions gradually rises over time. 
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Table 1. Basic Statistics 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ln Q 13,269,686 10.3568 3.1011 -6.2146 24.5452
ln μ 13,269,686 -0.0387 0.0669 -4.6030 0
Preference margin 13,269,686 0.0423 0.1113 0 98.7868  
Notes: μ is the ratio of one plus RTA rates to one plus MFN rates. Preference margin is the difference 
between MFN and RTA rates. The figures in this table are based on the observations in which MFN 
rates are positive. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Estimation Results of OLS 
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
ln μ -1.000*** -0.989*** -1.354*** -1.301***
[0.057] [0.053] [0.067] [0.060]
Product coverage Positive MFN All Positive MFN All
Exporter dummy Year Year Product-year Product-year
R-squared 0.8763 0.8772 0.8907 0.8898
Number of observations 13,269,686 20,287,377 12,787,045 19,688,671  
Notes: μ is a ratio of one plus RTA rates to one plus MFN rates. ***, **, and * represent significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels, respectively. The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard 
error is in parenthesis. Columns (I) and (II) include the exporter-year, importer-product-year, and 
exporter-importer-product fixed effects. Columns (III) and (IV) include the exporter-product-year 
fixed effects, instead of the exporter-year fixed effects. “Positive MFN” and “All” in product 
coverage indicate the inclusion of products with only positive MFN rates and that for all products, 
respectively. 
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Table 3. Further Controlling for Fixed Effects and Excluding RTA-ineligible Products 
(I) (II)
ln μ -1.327*** -2.483***
[0.071] [0.179]
Exporter-Importer-Year FE YES YES
Including one-valued μ YES NO
R-squared 0.8177 0.816
Number of observations 13,266,553 6,810,339  
Notes: μ is a ratio of one plus RTA rates to one plus MFN rates. ***, **, and * represent significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels, respectively. The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard 
error is in parenthesis. The exporter-year, importer-product-year, and exporter-importer-product 
fixed effects are included. In addition to these fixed effects, we include the exporter-importer-year 
fixed effects in column (I). In column (II), we exclude observations in which the tariff ratio equals to 
one. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Estimation Results under Sample Restrictions 
Manufacturing Differentiated Finished
ln μ -1.279*** -1.173*** -1.212***
[0.073] [0.074] [0.071]
R-squared 0.8746 0.8724 0.8772
Number of observations 11,468,778 8,823,670 6,317,120  
Notes: μ is a ratio of one plus RTA rates to one plus MFN rates. ***, **, and * represent significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels, respectively. The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard 
error is in parenthesis. The exporter-year, importer-product-year, and exporter-importer-product 
fixed effects are included. In “Manufacturing,” we exclude the trade of products in HS chapters 01–
24. In “Differentiated,” we restrict the sample products to differentiated products, in which the 
classification is based on the “liberal” classification of products by Rauch (1999). In “Finished,” we 
restrict the sample products to finished products, which are categorized into the 112, 112, 41, 51, 52, 
62, and 63 categories within the Broad Economic Categories. 
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Table 5. Estimation Results: Low-income Exporters versus High-income Exporters 
Interaction
Low-income High-income
ln μ -1.118*** -0.590*** -4.608***
[0.089] [0.092] [0.509]
ln μ * ln Exporter GDP per capita 0.279***
[0.039]
R-squared 0.8928 0.8798 0.8764
Number of observations 3,743,519 9,298,553 13,246,224
Exporters
 
Notes: μ is a ratio of one plus RTA rates to one plus MFN rates. ***, **, and * represent significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels, respectively. The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard 
error is in parenthesis. The exporter-year, importer-product-year, and exporter-importer-product 
fixed effects are included. “High-income” and “Low-income” are based on the World Bank 
classifications of income as of 2010. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. RTA Dummy Variable 
(I) (II)
RTA Dummy 0.042*** 0.012*
[0.007] [0.007]
ln μ -0.976***
[0.059]
R-squared 0.8763 0.8763
Number of observations 13,269,686 13,269,686  
Notes: RTA Dummy is a dummy variable taking the value one for country pairs with RTAs. μ is a 
ratio of one plus RTA rates to one plus MFN rates. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% statistical levels, respectively. The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard error is in 
parenthesis. The exporter-year, importer-product-year, and exporter-importer-product fixed effects 
are included.  
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Table 7. Estimation Results: Preference Margin 
(I) (II)
Preference margin 0.035*** 0.040***
[0.012] [0.013]
Product coverage Positive MFN All
R-squared 0.8763 0.8772
Number of observations 13,269,686 20,287,377  
Notes: Preference margin is the difference between MFN and RTA rates. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels, respectively. The heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard error is in parenthesis. The exporter-year, importer-product-year, and 
exporter-importer-product fixed effects are included. “Positive MFN” and “All” exclude and include 
the observations for products with zero MFN rates, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Zero-valued Trade Issues 
(I) (II) (III)
ln μ -0.479*** -0.177*** -0.245***
[0.010] [0.050] [0.010]
Trade coverage All Positive Positive
Aggregation Tariff-line HS6 Total
R-squared 0.5443 0.8849 0.9576
Number of observations 24,318,768 10,010,360 28,254  
Notes: Column (I) reports the estimation results of our tariff line–level, linear-probability model, in 
which a dependent variable takes the value one for positive trade and the value zero for no trade. 
Columns (II) and (III) show the results for equation (4) at two aggregation levels. “HS6” is an HS 
six-digit level. In “Total,” we aggregate up to the total bilateral trade values (i.e., 
exporter-importer-year observations). μ is a ratio of one plus RTA rates to one plus MFN rates. ***, 
**, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels, respectively. The 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard error is in parenthesis. The exporter-year, 
importer-product-year, and exporter-importer-product fixed effects are included. 
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Figure 1. Homogeneous Regime 
 
Source: Authors’ compilations 
 
 
Figure 2. Heterogeneous Regime 
 
Source: Authors’ compilations 
 
  
30 
 
Figure 3. Intensive and Extensive Margins in the Homogeneous Regime 
 
Source: Authors’ compilations 
 
 
Figure 4. Intensive and Extensive Margins in the Heterogeneous Regime 
 
Source: Authors’ compilations 
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Figure 5. Cumulative Effects of RTAs (%, log value) 
 
Source: Authors’ computations and Magee (2008) 
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Appendix A. A Case with Productivity Upper Bound 
 
In this appendix, we demonstrate a case with an upper bound of the firms’ 
productivity to replicate the case in which a product is only traded under the MFN tariff 
scheme, even between RTA member countries. To do this, we redefine the cumulative 
distribution function of productivity in the following manner: 
𝐺′(𝜑) = 1 − 𝜑−𝛼1 − � 1𝜑𝐻�𝛼 , 
where 𝜑𝐻 is the productivity upper bound and 𝜑𝐻>1. Suppose that (1 + 𝑓𝑖𝑅 𝑓𝑖⁄ )1 𝜐⁄ >1 𝜇𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)⁄ . In this case, products are traded under both RTA and MFN schemes (i.e., 
heterogeneous regime) if there is not an upper bound for productivity. 
An assumption that the productivity upper bound is so low that no exporters use 
the RTA tariff scheme for the transactions of the associated products enables us to show 
the case in which a product is only traded under the MFN tariff scheme. This condition 
is explicitly represented by 
�Φ�𝑖𝑗
𝑅 (𝑙, 𝑟)� 1𝜐−1 > 𝜑𝐻 . 
Total exports are given by 
   𝑄𝑖𝑗𝐶 (𝑙, 𝑟) = 𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑀(𝑙, 𝑟) = � 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑀(𝑙, 𝑟,𝑘)𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑀(𝑙, 𝑟,𝑘)𝐺′(𝜑)𝜑𝐻
�Φ� 𝑖𝑖
𝑀(𝑙,𝑟)� 1𝜐−1   
= 1
𝛼 − 𝜐 + 1�� 𝜁𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)𝑓𝑖𝑗�𝑇𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)�𝜐�
𝛼−𝜐+1
𝜐−1
− �
1
𝜑𝐻
�
𝛼−𝜐+1
�Θ𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟), 
where, 
Θ𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟) ≡ � 𝜐 − 1𝜐𝑇𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)𝜏𝑖𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)𝑤𝑗�𝜐−1 𝛼𝛽(𝑙)�𝑝𝑗(𝑙, 𝑟)�𝜐−𝜅�𝑝𝑗(𝑙)�𝜅−1𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑖1 − � 1𝜑𝐻�𝛼 . 
This equation implies that total exports of these products are decreasing in MFN rates. 
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Appendix B. Coefficients from Two Regimes 
 
Let 𝐗𝐴  (𝐗𝐵) , and 𝐘𝐴  (𝐘𝐵)  be vectors of the explanatory and dependent 
variables, respectively, for the sample in the homogeneous (heterogeneous) regime. 
Estimated coefficient vectors 𝛃𝐴 and 𝛃𝐵 are given by 
𝛃𝐴 = �𝐗𝐴′𝐗𝐴�−1 𝐗𝐴′𝐘𝐴, 𝛃𝐴 = �𝐗𝐵′𝐗𝐵�−1 𝐗𝐵′𝐘𝐵. 
Define the whole sample as 
𝐗 = �𝐗𝐴𝐗𝐵� , 𝐘 = �𝐘𝐴𝐘𝐵�, 
The regression of X on Y provides the following coefficient vector: 
𝛃 = �𝐗′𝐗�−1 𝐗′𝐘 = �𝐗𝐴′𝐗𝐴 + 𝐗𝐵′𝐗𝐵�−1 ��𝐗𝐴′𝐗𝐴�𝛃𝐴 + �𝐗𝐵′𝐗𝐵�𝛃𝐵�. 
Namely, 𝛃 is rewritten as the weighted average of 𝛃𝐴 and 𝛃𝐵. Note that 𝜊𝐴 and 𝜊𝐵 
correspond to �𝐗𝐴
′
𝐗𝐴 + 𝐗𝐵′𝐗𝐵�−1 �𝐗𝐴′𝐗𝐴�  and �𝐗𝐴′𝐗𝐴 + 𝐗𝐵′𝐗𝐵�−1 �𝐗𝐴′𝐗𝐴� 
respectively. 
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Appendix C. Sample Countries 
C1. Importers (43) 
Tariff-line Digit Sample Years Tariff-line Number
Argentina 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 11,000
Australia 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 6,000
Austria 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 10,000
Belgium 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 10,000
Brazil 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 10,000
Canada 8 2007 - 2010 Approximately 8,000
Chile 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 9,000
China 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 8,000
Colombia 10 2007 - 2011 Approximately 8,000
Costa Rica 10 2008 - 2010 Approximately 10,000
Czech Republic 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 10,000
Denmark 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 10,000
Finland 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 10,000
France 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 10,000
Germany 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 10,000
Greece 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 10,000
Hungary 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 10,000
Indonesia 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 8,000
Ireland 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 10,000
Italy 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 10,000
Japan 9 2007 - 2011 Approximately 9,000
Lithuania 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 10,000
Luxembourg 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 10,000
Mexico 8 2008 - 2010 Approximately 12,000
Netherlands 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 10,000
New Zealand 8 2007 - 2010 Approximately 7,000
Norway 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 7,000
Panama 8 2007 - 2008 Approximately 9,000
Peru 10 2007 - 2011 Approximately 8,000
Poland 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 10,000
Portugal 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 10,000
Romania 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 10,000
Russian Federation 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 10,000
Singapore 8 2007 - 2010 Approximately 12,000
Slovakia 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 10,000
Slovenia 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 10,000
South Africa 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 7,000
Spain 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 10,000
Sweden 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 10,000
Thailand 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 8,000
Turkey 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 10,000
United Kingdom 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 10,000
USA 8 2007 - 2011 Approximately 10,000  
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C2. Exporters (181) 
ABW, AFG, AGO, ALB, AND, ARE, ARG, ARM, ATG, AUS, AUT, AZE, BDI, BEL, 
BEN, BFA, BGD, BGR, BHR, BHS, BIH, BLR, BLZ, BMU, BOL, BRA, BRB, BRN, 
BTN, BWA, CAF, CAN, CHE, CHL, CHN, CIV, CMR, COG, COL, COM, CRI, CUB, 
CYP, CZE, DEU, DJI, DMA, DNK, DOM, DZA, ECU, EGY, ERI, ESP, EST, ETH, 
EUN, FIN, FJI, FRA, GAB, GBR, GEO, GHA, GIN, GMB, GNB, GRC, GRL, GTM, 
GUY, HKG, HND, HRV, HTI, HUN, IDN, IND, IRL, IRN, IRQ, ISL, ISR, ITA, JAM, 
JOR, JPN, KAZ, KEN, KGZ, KHM, KIR, KOR, KWT, LAO, LBN, LBR, LBY, LKA, 
LSO, LTU, LUX, LVA, MAC, MAR, MDA, MDG, MDV, MEX, MKD, MLI, MLT, 
MMR, MNG, MNT, MOZ, MRT, MTQ, MUS, MWI, MYS, NAM, NER, NGA, NIC, 
NLD, NOR, NPL, NZL, OMN, PAK, PAN, PER, PHL, PNG, POL, PRT, PRY, QAT, 
ROM, RUS, RWA, SAU, SDN, SEN, SER, SGP, SLV, SOM, STP, SUR, SVK, SVN, 
SWE, SWZ, SYR, TCD, TGO, THA, TJK, TKM, TMP, TON, TTO, TUN, TUR, TUV, 
TWN, TZA, UGA, UKR, URY, USA, VEN, VNM, VUT, YEM, ZAF, ZAR, ZMB, 
ZWE. 
 
 
